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Back to the Future: Reflections
on the Advent of Autonomous
Weapons Systems
Michael A. Newton 1
This essay refocuses the debate over autonomous weapons
systems to consider the potentially salutary effects of the
evolving technology. Law does not exist in a vacuum and cannot
evolve in the abstract. Jus in bello norms should be developed in
light of the overarching humanitarian goals, particularly since
such weapons are not “inherently unlawful or unethical” in all
circumstances. This essay considers whether a preemptive ban
on autonomous weapons systems is likely to be effective and
enforceable. It examines the grounds potentially justifying a
preemptive ban, concluding that there is little evidence that such
a ban would advance humanitarian goals because of a
foreseeable lack of complete adherence. The essay concludes by
suggesting three affirmative values that would be served by fully
vetted and field-tested technological advances represented by
autonomous weapons. Properly developed and deployed,
autonomous weapons might well advance the core purposes of
jus in bello by helping the balance the twin imperatives of
military necessity and humanitarian interests.
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Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School,
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Rudesheim, Ingrid Wuerth, and Michael P. Scharf for their respective
contributions to this article.
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I. Introduction
The prospect of autonomous weapons as a regularized feature of
future wars poses existential implications for the entire field of law
regulating the use of force. Such autonomous weapons may over time
become so commonplace and so uncontrollable that the idea of human
decision-making, based on good faith efforts to comply with legal
norms, as an outer limit to war making becomes eviscerated. At the
time of this writing, autonomous weapons thus face pre-demonization
aimed at freezing development or proliferation. Proponents of a
complete ban on autonomous weapons frame the issue as centering on
the prohibition of so called “killer robots.” 2 This notion admittedly
strikes a visceral nerve among the public at large, not to mention
military experts and ethicists. The law of war is an inescapable aspect
of the dialogue among people of good conscience who appreciate the
awful consequences inherent in the waging of modern wars. For those
seeking a preemptory ban on autonomous systems, such unease
overshadows the costs of failing to explore the limits of technology or
develop a full understanding of the information interface between
humans and autonomous weapons that might well alter the ethical
compass.
Indeed, the Secretary General of the United Nations questioned
whether it can ever be “morally acceptable to delegate decisions about
the use of lethal force to such systems” and wondered aloud whether
the lack of individual culpability against a machine launching lethal
force would ever make it “legal or ethical to deploy such systems.” 3
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the subject goes a step further to
specifically recommend an immediate “national moratorium on at
least the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition,
deployment of LARs [lethal autonomous robotics] until such time as
an internationally agreed upon framework on the future of LARs has
been established.” 4 When the debate is framed as one in which
2.

Acknowledging the implicit power of this argument, the U.S.
Department of Defense seeks to assure scholars and practitioners that
“for a significant period into the future, the decision to pull the trigger
or launch a missile from an unmanned system will not be fully
automated, but it will remain under the full control of a human
operator.” U.S. DEF. DEP’T, FY 2009-2034 UNMANNED SYSTEMS
ROADMAP 10 (2009).

3.

UN Meeting Targets ‘Killer Robots,’ UN NEWS (May 14, 2014),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47794#.VOCz8LDFf9.

4.

Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary
Executions, Annual Rep. on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HCR/23/47, ¶ 113 (April 9, 2013) (by Christof
Heyns).
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“tireless war machines” hold the potential to “take decisions of life or
death out of human hands,” 5 such concerns seem eminently
appropriate for preserving the integrity of international efforts to
protect innocent lives during conflicts.
This short essay nevertheless aims to refocus the debate. Law
does not exist in a vacuum. Legal norms always operate in synergy
with changing contexts and often rapidly emerging challenges. They
establish societal expectations and shape correlative rights in
accordance with the shared experiences of other states. The
experience of warfighters is an essential component of the effort to
regulate armed conflicts. As with any emerging technology for waging
war, the legal regime serves to reinforce accepted value structures. In
perhaps his most famous observation, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
noted that
“the life of the law has never been logic: it has been experience.
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do with the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed.” 6

Because normative shifts in the law never serve as a complete
tabula rasa, they, as well as the policy preferences that animate such
legal reforms, do not march with the linear certainty of mathematical
extrapolation or algebraic formulae. They move instead in episodic
response to shifting valuations and perceptions in light of the everchanging tide of human events and the inevitable technological
innovations that have shaped our world since the Enlightenment.
This essay will question the overall validity of the legal
assumptions marshalled to support a preemptive ban on autonomous
weapons. It concludes by postulating some salutary purposes that
could be served by the development of lethal autonomous
technologies, or at a minimum could guide future research in order to
solve some of the most vexing issues the warrior faces in modern
combat. Autonomous weapons platforms that operate in conformity
with international humanitarian law could actually advance
compliance with the law in the aggregate, as well as minimizing the
human costs of conflict. This essay will first consider the arguments
for a preemptive ban and conclude by postulating three possible
contributions to legal norms of fielded autonomous weapons. Such
salutary considerations have been almost entirely avoided in the
passionate positions already staked out. Given the seemingly
inevitable pace of technological change, it seems most opportune to
5.

Id. at ¶¶ 109–10.

6.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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think prospectively about the affirmative role that autonomous
weapons could serve in actually reinforcing compliance with the laws
and customs of warfare, rather than simply assuming that they
cannot be compatible. If we know anything about the pace of
technological innovation over the past two decades, we should
recognize that it proceeds far faster than preconceptions will predict.
An affirmative vision of how to make technology serve larger societal
interests is much more salutary when it is articulated early enough to
actually shape innovation to serve social goals, rather than forcing
legal and social norms to mold around newly fielded technologies. So
it should be with the interface between autonomous weapons systems
and the laws and customs of warfare.

II. The Law and Technological Adaptation
At the outset, it must be understood that the campaign for a
moratorium on all autonomous weapons systems must be assessed
against the backdrop of personalities and politics. Some of the same
people that championed the 1997 Ottawa Convention, 7 banning the
use, production, or transfer of anti-personnel landmines, figure
prominently in the similar efforts regarding autonomous weapons. The
game is the same, but played on a different field before a different
audience and with different rules. The minimal decline in landmine
use worldwide over the past two decades, 8 and the devastating spread
of improvised explosive devices (which are their functional
equivalent), 9 should provide an instructive and cautionary exemplar
when advocates automatically assume the utility of a total ban on
autonomous weapons systems. Total bans have never been wholly
effective in changing state practice as a standalone matter. This is
partially true because there will always be an incentive for some
actors to gain disproportionate advantages by ignoring such

7.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18,
1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.

8.

Sharp Drop in Landmine Casualties; But International Funding for
Remaining Mine Clearance Declines, INT’L CAMPAIGN TO BAN
LANDMINES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-andevents/news/2014/landmine-monitor-2014-launch.aspx
(noting
that
while deaths resulting from landmines have dropped to their lowest
levels since tracking began in 1999, fifty-six states still have active
landmines).

9.

Peter W. Singer, The Evolution of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs),
INST.
(Feb.
2012),
http://www.brookings.edu/
BROOKINGS
research/articles/2012/02/improvised-explosive-devices-singer.

8

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015)
Reflections on the Advent of Autonomous Weapons Systems

constraints. 10 Similarly, the strident movement for a moratorium on
the development or deployment of autonomous weapons is squarely
situated against the international angst caused by the widespread use
of drones to strike enemies of the United States on foreign soil
without the public expression of support by the affected sovereign
state. The push for a ban on autonomous weapons has at times had
the flavor of a politicized push to punish the United States for its
controversial use of extraterritorial drone strikes. 11 There is a strong
waft of politics that cannot be entirely disentangled from the legal
posturing. Legal evolution never serves as a tabula rasa; thus, the
lawyer/counselor must be as objective as possible in framing the
issues based on law and precedent rather than passion and politics.
In this vein, the history of the law of armed conflict itself provides
reason to believe that the law will adapt as needed in the wake of
technological innovation. Throughout its history, jus in bello 12 has
adapted at the precise points of friction with changing technology in
order to reinforce the validity of legal regulation, while preserving the
ability to wage war lawfully. Esteemed scholars have advocated
precisely this view on the basis that autonomous weapons “are not
inherently unlawful or unethical,” and that their responsible and
effective use can conceivably be situated within a modified
understanding of legal and ethical norms. 13 It cannot be overstated
that the moral tension between evolving technology and the
application of the precise legal rules designed to minimize the cruelty
and inhumanity during conflict represents one of the enduring threads
within the field. Shifting legal norms have always echoed a strand of
Just War thinking that has sought to define the proper bounds for
waging war. 14 St. Augustine wrote that peace “is not sought in order
to provoke war, but war is waged in order to attain peace. Be a
peacemaker, then, even by fighting, so that through your victory you
might bring those whom you defeated to the advantages of peace.” 15
10.

Steven Groves & Ted R. Bromund, The Ottawa Mine Ban Convention:
Unacceptable on Substance and Process, 2496 BACKGROUNDER 1, 20
(2010).

11.

Larisa Epatko, Controversy Surrounds Increased Use of U.S. Drone
Strikes, PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/rundown/2011/10/drone-strikes-1.html.

12.

Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, 37
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 553, 553–62 (1997)

13.

Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Op-Ed., Killer Robots and the
Laws of War, WALL ST. J., NOV. 3, 2013, at A19.

14.

See generally JUST WAR THEORY (Jean Bethke Elshtain ed., 1992)
(compiling different elements of the theory into a volume).

15.

See ST. AUGUSTINE, AUGUSTINE: POLITICAL WRITINGS 217 (E.M. Atkins
& R.J. Dodaro eds., 2004).
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Law and technology have operated in a healthy tension with each
other that over time creates a new equilibrium. Among many other
illustrative examples of this phenomenon, the Second Lateran Council
sought to ban the crossbow from medieval battlefields as anathema
and “hateful to God” because “men of non-knightly order could fell a
knight.” 16 In contrast to preemptive bans on whole classes of weapons,
the changing pace of technological advancement has more often
necessitated legal reforms. The effort to ban cross-bows fell into
desuetude as the invention of firearms using gunpowder for lethal
purposes obviated efforts to ban cross-bows. 17 In a more modern
example, the law of targeting evolved in response to new technologies
and the shifting experiences and expectations of the international
community. Following the World War II bombings of entire cities,18
current law requires disaggregation of specific targets within a “city,
town or village or other area containing a similar concentration of
civilians or civilian objects,” which in turn requires a series of discrete
distinction and proportionality assessments for each target. 19 Jus in
16.

G.I.A.D. Draper, The Interaction of Christianity and Chivalry in the
Historical Development of the Law of War, 46 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 3,
19 (1965).

17.

See TREVOR N. DUPUY, THE EVOLUTION
(1984)

18.

For a succinct history of this era and discussion of the shifts in legal and
moral thinking over time see BOMBING CIVILIANS: A TWENTIETHCENTURY HISTORY (Yuki Tanaka & Marilyn B. Young eds., 2009).

19.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) art. 51, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 17512 (which classifies
such intentional attacks as being per se indiscriminate and therefore
prohibited) [hereinafter Protocol I]; see also Customary International
Humanitarian Law: Volume II (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). The Official ICRC Commentary to
Additional Protocol I makes it clear that the provisions of Article 51
flowed directly from the practices during World War II and the
reactions thereto:

OF

WEAPONS

AND

WARFARE 91

The attacks which form the subject of this paragraph fall under the
general prohibition of indiscriminate attacks laid down at the beginning
of paragraph 4. Two types of attack in particular are envisaged here.
The ‘ first type ‘ includes area bombardment, sometimes known as
carpet bombing or saturation bombing. It is characteristic of such
bombing that it destroys all life in a specific area and razes to
the ground all buildings situated there. There were many examples of
such bombing during the Second World War, and also during some
more recent conflicts. Such types of attack have given rise to strong
public criticism in many countries, and it is understandable that the
drafters of the Protocol wished to mention it specifically, even though
such attacks already fall under the general prohibition contained in
paragraph 4. According to the report of Committee III, the expression
“bombardment by any method or means” means all attacks by fire-arms
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bello provides flexible, but not indeterminate, standards that
automatically expand to suit any new form of warfare. 20 And so it has
been throughout the history of the positivist law; as the tactics for
warfare have shifted with the advent of new technologies, so has that
shift necessitated legal innovations to serve the perceived needs of
nations and preserve the values of humanity.
At the same time, jus in bello itself has never been infinitely
malleable based on the individualized will of combatants and the
convenience of technological superiority. Though laws and customs of
warfare have a fixed and accepted form in diverse usages, the correct
application of the legal and moral precepts depends entirely on the
facts available, the reasonable perceptions of participants, and the
overall motivations of the decision-makers. Subjective assessments
that are entirely permissible within the legal framework are always
bounded by non-negotiable tenets of military necessity and human
dignity. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 extended this tenet by
recognizing that “the laws of war do not recognize in belligerents an
unlimited power in the adoption of means of injuring the enemy.” 21
The concretized formulation of the 1907 Hague Regulations provided
a fitting positivist formulation to this developmental arc in specifying
that “the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is
not unlimited.” 22 The modern formulation of this foundational
principle is captured in Article 35 of Additional Protocol I as follows:
“In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.” 23 This same
spirit animated the judges of the Tokyo District Court to hold that
the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were disproportionate

or projectiles (except for direct fire by small arms) and the use of any
type of projectile.
INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 Art.
51, ¶¶ 1967–68 (Sandoz et al, eds.1987) [hereinafter ADD’L PROTOCOLS
COMMENT.].
20.

See Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello?
Reaffirming the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 963, 976.

21.

The Brussels Project of an International Declaration Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War art. 12, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER &
JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 21–28 (2d ed. 1981).

22.

Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, 1907, art. 22, entered into force Jan. 26,
1910, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 43, 52 (Adam
Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982) [hereinafter 1907 Hague
Regulations].

23.

Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 3.
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in Ryuichi Shimoda et. al. v. The State. 24 The Court discounted
arguments that the bombings shortened the war, saved hundreds of
thousands of lives (both military and civilian), and perhaps laid the
foundation for a modern Japanese state able to enjoy a sustained
peace by virtue of averting what would have been destruction on a
vast scale as allied armies advanced across the Home Islands:
It can be naturally assumed that the use of a new weapon is
legal, as long as international law does not prohibit it. However,
the prohibition in this context is to be understood to include
not only the case where there is an express provision of direct
prohibition, but also the case where the prohibition can be
implied . . . from the interpretation and application by analogy
of existing rules of international law (customary international
laws and treaties). Further, the prohibition must be understood
also to include the case where, in the light of principles of
international law which are the basis of these positive rules of
international law, the use of new weapons is admitted to be
contrary to the principles . . . . 25

To summarize, the entire body of the laws and customs of warfare
represents an evolving compromise between the principles of military
efficacy and humanity. Shifts in technological capacity, then, require
application of the laws of warfare “even with respect to weapons that
did not exist at the time when those principles were affirmed.” 26 The
consistent pattern has been for legal evolution against the backdrop of
changing tactics and technological innovations, rather than broad
preemptive proscriptions designed to address shifts in technological
abilities that can merely be anticipated but not yet ascertained. There
is no reason to believe that the advent of autonomous weapons would
be any different. As information about capabilities becomes available
and tactics adjust accordingly, the legal debates would follow in short
order as night follows day.

24.

Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho (Tokyo Dist. Ct.) Dec. 7 1963, 355 HANREI JIHŌ
[HANJI] 17(Japan), translated in 8 JAPAN ANN. INT’L L. 212 (1964)
reprinted in 32 I.L.R. 626 (1994).

25.

Id. at 32 I.L.R. 628–29.

26.

Marina Castellaneta, New Weapons, Old Crimes?, in WAR CRIMES
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES: CHALLENGES TO ADJUDICATION
INVESTIGATION 194, 195 (Fausto Pocar, et.al. eds., 2013).
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III. Autonomous Weapons as the New Legal Frontier
At the same time, some legal scholars have seized on the very
nature of the legal regime to argue that fully autonomous weapons
presumptively violate jus in bello as it has already evolved. Judge
Meron, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, has written that “human rights norms have
infiltrated the law of war to a significant degree.” 27 He traces this
influence back into the natural law tradition, but its clearest modern
influence is in the famous Martens Clause that originated in the 1899
Hague Regulations. The Martens Clause states in its entirety:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the
High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases
not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations
and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity
and the requirements of the public conscience. 28

The Russian publicist, jurist, and diplomat Fyodor Fyodorovich
Martens proposed this compromise language as something of a
diplomatic grab-bag or pressure relief valve to alleviate sharp disputes
between nations in the negotiations, especially concerning the
relationship between civilians and combatants. 29 The sentiment
embodied in the Martens Clause would be substantially replicated in
all four Geneva conventions of 1949, 30 Article 1, paragraph 2 of the
1977 Additional Protocol I, 31 and the Preamble of the 1977 Additional
27.

THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (2006).

28.

Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(Hague II) pmbl., Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, Treaty Series 403.

29.

See Vladimir Vasilievich Pustogaro, Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens (18451909)—A Humanist of Modern Times, 36 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 300,
311–12 (1996) (detailing the life and achievements of diplomat Fyodor
Fyodorovich Martens).

30.

Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 63, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114; 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea art. 62, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 142,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 158,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

31.

Protocol I, supra note 18, art. I, ¶ 2 (“In cases not covered by this
Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants
remain under the protection and authority of the principles of
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Protocol II. 32 Perhaps because of its evasive but enduring phraseology,
the Martens Clause has been widely cited by courts, international
organizations, human rights advocates, tribunals, and individuals.
Judge Meron summarized that, while the Martens Clause has had farreaching effect, he is “far less confident, however, that the Martens
Clause has had any influence on the battlefield.” 33 Its contortions in
both domestic and international jurisprudence led the late jurist
Antonio Cassese to say that the Martens Clause has become one of
the “legal myths of the international community.” 34 The Clause
nevertheless reflected an underlying and enduring consensus that the
humanitarian aspiration, even in the midst of conflict, cannot be
completely discounted on the basis of expediency or artful treaty
drafting.
Of particular note in the context of efforts to ban autonomous
weapons systems, the Preamble to the Certain Conventional Weapons
Convention of 1980 (CCW) 35 repeats the Martens Clause sentiment
that “in cases not covered by [international agreements] the civilian
population and the combatants shall at all times remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from

international law derived from established custom, from the principles of
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”).
32.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection Of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), of 8 June 1977, pmbl, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17513
[hereinafter Protocol II].

33.

MERON, supra note 26, at 28.

34.

Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clauses: Half a Loaf or Pie in the Sky,
11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 188 (2000).

35.

See Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I) pmbl.,
October 18, 1907., 205 CTS 264; 1 Bevans 619; Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177,
24 U.S.T. 564; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protocol II, supra note
31 at Article 1;Protocol I, supra note 18 at pmbl., ¶ 2;Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate
Effects,
Geneva,
10
October
1980,
pmbl.,
CCW/CONF.II/2, 19 I.L.M. 1823 (1980) [hereinafter Convention on
Prohibitions of Certain Conventional Weapons].
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the dictates of public conscience.” 36 On its face, this language extends
well past the original aspiration of the Martens Clause to protect
civilians resisting occupation. Full exploration of the nuanced
interconnections between this non-binding Preambular language and
the body of applicable jus in bello and human rights law is beyond the
scope of this essay. However, the CCW is, at the time of this writing,
the locus of international efforts to debate the future for autonomous
weapons systems. Delegations representing some twenty-seven nations
and a wide variety of international experts and organizations attended
the meetings in Geneva held in May 2014 to “discuss the questions
related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous
weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the
Convention.” 37
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), some experts believe that even if autonomous weapons
systems can be used in compliance with applicable jus in bello
provisions, the penumbra of the Martens Clause as echoed in the
CCW Preamble would constrain the use of machines making life and
death decisions “with little or no human control.” 38 In its official
statement to the May 2014 meeting of experts in Geneva, the ICRC
extended this sentiment to conclude that “perhaps the most
fundamental question is whether autonomous weapon systems are
compatible with the principles of humanity and the dictates of public
conscience. There is a deep sense of discomfort with the idea of any
weapon system that places the use of force beyond human control.”39
The definitive fit between the unfocused aspirations of the Martens
Clause and its reincarnation in the CCW Preamble will be determined
by national delegations in the future. For our purposes, it must be
noted that there is no diplomatic history nor any evidence of state
practice since 1899 on which practitioners or policy makers could
anchor a broad ban on development or deployment of autonomous
weapons systems. Indeed, the Martens concept would be forced to
bear a wholly unprecedented and unforeseen burden if it becomes the
fulcrum for forcing a preemptive ban on a developing class of
36.

Convention on Prohibitions of Certain Conventional Weapons, pmbl.

37.

See id.

38.

INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, EXPERT MEETING ON ‘AUTONOMOUS WEAPON
SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS’,
26-28 MARCH 2014, GENEVA 15 (2014).

39.

Statement from Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), 13-16 May 2014 (May 13,
2014),
available
at
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/
(httpAssets)/C99C06D328117A11C1257CD7005D8753/$file/ICRC_MX
_LAWS_2014.pdf.
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technology. The Martens Clause was simply not intended to be the
primary weight bearing pillar of international humanitarian law.
Basing a preemptive ban on weapons on its spare text would therefore
be unprecedented and unwarranted.

IV. How Law and Technology Can Develop
Concurrently
This essay will conclude by postulating three affirmative values
that could be enhanced by the development and deployment of
autonomous weapons systems. Law should indeed conform to social
experience in light of the most feasible approach to achieving the
desirable societal goals. As a distinctive field of law, jus in bello can
only be understood in light of the truism that the established lex lata
represents a finely honed balance between buttressing the ability of
war-fighters to accomplish the military mission, even as the extensive
system of constraints for lawfully doing so seeks to protect human
lives and civilian property to the greatest degree possible. 40 Unlike the
field of human rights, lethal force in armed conflict is permissible
whenever reasonably necessary to achieve a military objective absent
evidence of some prohibited purpose or unlawful tactic. 41 In other
words, jus in bello operates on a presumed permissive basis subject to
express limitations precisely because it must be applied during
hostilities by war-fighters as an extension of disciplined
professionalism even in the midst of mind-numbing fatigue, adrenalin,
and soul felt fear. The debate over the appropriate role of autonomous
weapons systems juxtaposed against larger efforts to inculcate
compliance with international humanitarian law, in part, derives from
this essential DNA of the field.
The very purpose of jus in bello is to facilitate the difficult moral
and legal choices that require human judgment in order to preserve
human dignity and life to the greatest degree possible in light of the
military mission. 42 These purposes could be enhanced by the use of
autonomous weapons in three distinct ways: 1) they could sharpen the
40.

See Mark Newton, Charging War Crimes: Policy & Prognosis from a
Military Perspective, in THE LAW & PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
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ACHIEVEMENTS, (forthcoming 2015).
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Serena K. Sharma, Reconsidering the Jus Ad Bellum/Jus in Bello
Distinction, in JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM
CONFLICT TO PEACE 9, 10 (Carsten Stahn & Jann K. Kleffner eds.,
2008) (explaining the origin and rationale of jus in bello in contrast to
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ability of warfighters to distinguish between protected persons and
property and the subjects of lawful military attack; 2) they could
provide a significant boost to current obstacles for deterring violations
during non-international armed conflicts or those waged primarily by
non-state actors; and 3) they could boost the efforts of law abiding
nations to defeat adversaries that increasingly resort to urban warfare
and intentionally commingle with civilian populations. These
potential goals should be prioritized as research into autonomous
weapons systems continues, assuming of course that the foreseeable
technological barriers to the complex decision-making that is an
integral part of good faith compliance with jus in bello can be
overcome.
At a superficial level, the ICRC view is understandable because
autonomous weapons seem inconsistent with the quintessential
expressions of the laws and customs of warfare by which objective
standards are applied from the evaluative perspectives of diverse
humans caught in the midst of conflict. Jus in bello is permissive by
its express terms insofar as it defines the limits of lawful authority,
rather than operating as an affirmative grant of authority. But that
permissive character in turn relies on the assessments of human
beings who must conform to the legal standards under shifting
circumstances and on the basis of incomplete or often inaccurate
information. Even as there are abundant examples in jus in bello of
express prohibitions subject to no caveats, combatants exercise what
the ICRC has labeled a “fairly broad margin of judgment.” 43 For
example, medical care is due those in military custody only “to the
fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay.”44
Obligations are repeatedly couched in aspirational terms such as
“whenever possible” 45 or “as widely as possible.” 46 Other duties are
framed in less than strident terms such as “shall endeavor” 47 or the
duty to “take all practical precautions.” 48 There are also express
exceptions permitted for reasons of “imperative military necessity.” 49
The fine-grained and context-specific reasoning necessitated by
these legal standards seems almost unimaginable in the hands of a
computer programmed weapons platform. At the same time, who
would have anticipated the internet at the time the 1977 Additional
Protocols were negotiated, or satellite communications, or
43.
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44.
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45.
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47.
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smartphones, or the evolution of digital communications? A broadbased ban on development and deployment risks short-circuiting new
technologies that could make such evaluative reasoning free from
passions, prejudices, or external pressures. Indeed, autonomous
weapons might actually advance adherence to these legal tenets by
eliminating information barriers and ensuring instantaneous
adjustment of tactics across linguistic or cultural boundaries that
normally divide human military units in wartime. Thus, autonomous
weapons systems may well be able to statistically enhance compliance
with established legal norms by facilitating dispassionate compliance
that is flexible enough to shift almost instantaneously in accordance
with rapidly changing circumstances that might undermine human
decision-making in similar contexts.
The basic law of targeting imposes another seemingly
insurmountable barrier to compliant computer-powered autonomous
weapons. For the purposes of proportionality, the most relevant
permissive duties incumbent on those who order military strikes
require them to “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to
be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects” 50 and “take all
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack
with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian
objects.” 51 As a logical extension, “effective advance warning shall be
given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit [emphasis added].” 52 The commander’s
actions “must be made in good faith and in view of all information
that can be said to be reasonably available in the specific situation”
according to the ICRC. 53 This seemingly requires human judgment
and human assessment rather than automated programming. This
permissive jus in bello framing empowers those in the vortex of battle
to balance the legitimate military needs against larger humanitarian
imperatives. It is important to note that the benchmark for what is
“feasible” is measured from the reasonable war-fighter’s point of view.
In fact, modern international criminal law expressly preserves broad
discretionary authority.
For example, Article 23 of the 1899 Hague II Convention stated
that it was forbidden “[t]o destroy or seize the enemy’s property,
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
50.

Protocol I, supra note 18, at art. 57(2)(a)(i).

51.
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necessities of war.” 54 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court repeated that same language in Articles 8(2)(b)(xiii) and
8(2)(e)(xii)(respectively applicable during international and noninternational armed conflicts). 55 Based on their belief that the concept
of military necessity ought to be an unacceptable component of
military decision-making, some civilian delegates sought to introduce
a higher subjective threshold by which to second-guess military
operations. 56 They proposed a verbal formula for the Elements of
Crimes that any seizure of civilian property would be valid only if
based on “imperative military necessity.” 57 There is no evidence in the
traveaux of the Rome Statute that its drafters intended to alter the
preexisting fabric of the laws and customs of war. 58 Introducing a
tiered gradation of military necessity, as proposed, would have built a
doubly high wall that would have had a paralyzing effect on military
operations. A double threshold for the established concept of military
necessity would have clouded the decision-making of commanders and
soldiers who must balance the legitimate need to accomplish the
mission against the mandates of the law. In my view, requiring
“imperative military necessity” as a necessary condition for otherwise
permissible actions would have introduced a wholly subjective and
unworkable formulation that would foreseeably have exposed military
commanders to after-the-fact personal criminal liability for their good
faith judgments.
The important point for our purposes is that the twin concepts of
military necessity and feasibility preserve jus in bello as a practicable
body of law that balances humanitarian and military considerations,
at least when applied by reasonable, well-intentioned, and well trained
humans. 59 In our hearts, we simply trust humans more, even as we
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acknowledge that they must make decisions based on imperfect
information in suboptimal conditions and often with inadequate
resources. This understanding helps to explain why advocates of a ban
are adamant that the role of criminal accountability for flawed
decision-making is an integral component of jus in bello. 60 Machines
cannot be prosecuted, and the line of actual responsibility to
programmers or policy makers becomes too attenuated to support
liability. Of course, such considerations overlook the distinct
possibility that technological advances may well make adherence to
established jus in bello duties far more regularized. Information could
flow across programmed weapons systems in an instantaneous and
comprehensive manner, and thereby facilitate compliance with the
normative goals of the laws of war. A preemptive ban on autonomous
weapons would prevent future policy makers that seek to maximize
the values embedded in jus in bello from ever being in position to
make informed choices on whether to use humans or autonomous
systems for a particular operational task.
Of course, any sentient observer knows that we do indeed live in a
flawed and dangerous world. There is little precedent to indicate that
a complete ban would garner complete adherence. Banning
autonomous systems might do little more than incentivize asymmetric
research by states or non-state armed groups that prioritize their own
military advantage above compliance with the normative framework
of the law. There has been far too little analysis of the precise ways
that advancing technology might well serve the interests of lawabiding states as they work towards regularized compliance with the
laws and customs of war. Proponents of a complete ban on
autonomous weapons simply assume technological innovations away,
and certainly undervalue the benefits of providing some affirmative
vision of a desired end state to researchers and scientists.

V. Autonomous Weapons in Compliance with Jus in
Bello
This essay concludes by suggesting three plausible and affirmative
values that could be served by fully vetted and field-tested
technological advances embedded in deployed autonomous weapons.
In the first place, the principle of distinction forms the prime directive
for jus in bello. Combatants must at all times seek to distinguish
themselves from protected civilians and must direct their warlike
211–12 (2000) (discussing how military actors ought to help craft
international law).
60.
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actions only against other combatants. This principle is subject to no
caveats or carve outs. 61 Autonomous weapons might well be able to
advance this eminently desirable objective by focusing lethal violence
only on the appropriately identified target. Imagine the capability to
precisely strike the terrorist who is hiding in the midst of human
shields. It would absolutely be desirable if that could be done without
causing clearly excessive disproportionate damage to the innocent
civilian lives and property. Similarly, autonomous weapons might be
able to sort through the various weapons signatures and precisely
identify the source of an attack and direct pin-point violence exactly
where it can only kill or injure those responsible for the attack. To
reiterate, the instantaneous flow of information across linguistic
barriers or national boundaries and across military units might well
have a deterrent effect by making the consequences of military action
felt with far more immediacy.
By extension, individual deterrence could well be enhanced by
autonomous weapons that are able to target individuals based on
specific features. Incentivizing non-state armed groups to comply with
the law of war is one of the most insoluble problems facing the field
today. That is why the dramatic trend in prosecutions over the past
decade has involved rampant campaigns of criminality committed by
militias in areas where they feel far removed from any force of law.
However, imagine that weapons systems are developed and fielded
that can receive and process the biometric data of the target. Such
things may already be on the horizon with the development of facial
recognition software, but no one really knows the limits of technology.
If biometric data of an individual target is combined with field DNA
analysis, then discrimination and personal deterrence would be
advanced to unprecedented levels. For example, Joseph Kony could in
theory be found and targeted by Ugandan authorities even as he hides
in the jungle. Autonomous weapons might be able to go places where
humans cannot and to use force with more precision and far greater
personal focus than was ever possible. Autonomous weapons systems
might even be able to cancel an attack if the computer identifies an
incorrect target on the basis of eyeball scans or other unique
biometric “signatures.” This might be the most effective form of
deterrence because a tireless machine would not rest until a particular
perpetrator was either immobilized or killed. Such personal deterrence
represents the gaping hole in current compliance efforts.
Autonomous weapons systems could conceptually be the key to
conducting urban warfare that is both effective militarily and far
more compatible with the goals of jus in bello. As much of the world’s
population centralizes in large urban centers, and non-state actors
increasingly seek to use urban areas as the locus of military
61.
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operations, current tactics have lagged behind. Westernized forces
that want to minimize damage to civilian lives and property are
increasingly confronted with adversaries that seek sanctuary among
civilians. 62 Participants in conflict that are intertwined with civilian
populations cannot be rooted out with conventional bombs or
missiles, and street-to-street fighting endangers many more civilians.
Fielding of tailored autonomous weapons systems that can be
activated at times and areas seeking to strike insurgents, and not
civilians, may hold great promise. This seems fanciful at present, but
who would have foreseen GPS watches or the evolution of satellite
radio when vacuum tube televisions were still the rage?
Technology should be the servant of society and not its
antagonist. Prospectively seeking technological innovation that
enhances compliance with jus in bello, rather than endangering its
viability, seems far more advisable than a preemptive ban. Sound
policy seldom proceeds from assumptions and aspersions. This is not
an unprecedented problem in the context of warfare. Lt . Gen. Sir Ian
Hamilton, for example, summarized the difficulty of accurate battle
history in the Preface to his own observer’s diary of the RussoJapanese War, entitled A Staff Officer ‘s Scrap Book. His concluding
thought is often quoted out of context, 63 but the longer text of his
1905 comment is more than apropos to our discussion of autonomous
weapons systems:
If facts are hurriedly issued, fresh from the mint of battle, they
cannot be expected to supply an account which is either well
balanced or exhaustive. On the other hand, it is equally certain
that, when once the fight has been fairly lost or won, it is the
tendency of all ranks to combine and recast the story of their
achievement into a shape which shall satisfy the susceptibilities
of national and regimental vain-glory. It is then already too late
for the painstaking historian to set to work. He may record the
orders given and the movements which ensued, and he may
build hopes and fears which dictated those orders, and to the
spirit and method in which those movements were executed, he
has for ever lost the clue. On the actual day of battle naked
truths may be picked up for the asking; by the following
morning they have already begun to get into their uniform. 64
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VI. Conclusion
If there is anything we can predict about technological innovation,
it is that it proceeds unpredictably. The potential for autonomous
weapons is too immense, and the implications for the future of
warfare too important to be assumed away or to remain unexplored.
We should not be afraid of technology but should always seek to
harness its development in ways that seem most suitable for human
purposes. Any preemptive ban would be the result of a long
diplomatic process and thus a suboptimal negotiated text that would
be implemented only intermittently and undermined at will by
motivated state or non-state actors. Thus, policymakers and those
who seek to enhance the goals of jus in bello would be well served to
advocate for focused research efforts that seek to overcome some of
the most pressing problems facing the field. Compliance with the laws
and customs of warfare cannot be cut and pasted into the thinking of
practitioners and lawyers across contexts. We ought, therefore, to
think critically and carefully about the role and relevance of
autonomous weapons and to guide their development so that they
advance the core purposes of jus in bello. Properly developed and
deployed, autonomous weapons systems could in fact strengthen
compliance with the law by reinforcing its laudatory goals: Balance,
symmetry, military effectiveness, and, perhaps most of all, the
enduring interests of humanity.
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